India’s malicious strategic Hunt: Breaching the International Protocols

History serves as an invaluable learning resource for humanity and nations alike. A responsible and forward-thinking nation learns from the mistakes and negative experiences of others, aiming to avoid undesirable consequences by not repeating the same actions under similar circumstances. In contrast, a nation with hostile and malicious intentions often continues down a destructive path, ultimately causing trouble for itself and those nearby. India exemplifies this latter scenario, particularly during the Cold War era of the 1960s and early 1970s, when its focus was directed toward developing nuclear weapons and destabilizing the region for its benefit.

The Second World War concluded and gave way to the Cold War, characterized by an intense arms race between two superpowers, ignited by the United States’ nuclear detonation on July 16, 1945. This initiated a relentless competition between the two powers, each attempting to outmaneuver the other in the quest for strategic dominance.

The world faced a new security dilemma after enduring the devastation of two world wars. The introduction of nuclear weapons redefined the landscape of conflict and opposition. As the arms race escalated, endangering millions of lives not only in the United States and the Soviet Union but across the globe, there emerged an urgent need for peaceful and civil uses of nuclear energy, alongside a crucial necessity for nonproliferation treaties. On December 8, 1953, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed the “Atoms for Peace” initiative during his address to the 470th plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This framework aimed to share non-military nuclear technology, training, and materials with nations worldwide. The “Atoms for Peace” program could have significantly benefited developing countries, promoting advancements in agriculture, medicine, energy production, and various industrial sectors, provided the underlying goals aligned with the public’s best interests. Many countries took advantage of this opportunity for the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

However, India, driven by its malevolent ambitions, failed to recognize the positive aspects of the “Atoms for Peace” program. Instead, it viewed it as a means to extend the arms race into South Asia, conducting its first nuclear test, “Pokhran-I,” in May 1974, disguising it under the guise of a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) code-named “Smiling Buddha”. This nuclear test was met with immense internal acclaim while drawing international condemnation. India’s actions disregarded the risks and costs associated with destabilizing the already volatile security landscape of the region.

The decision to conduct Pokhran-I not only set India on a path toward nuclear weaponization but also dealt a significant blow to the American-led effort to contain nuclear proliferation through treaty compliance. Following this test, international nuclear watchdogs like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and treaties such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) failed to curb India’s nuclear ambitions, which exacerbated the precarious security situation in South Asia, particularly in the context of India-Pakistan relations. Despite a global trend toward détente in the 1970s, India remained undeterred in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. This prompted Pakistan to seek measures to balance the security equation, given the historical rivalry, ongoing conflicts, and the emerging strategic imbalance.

In response to India’s actions, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed in 1974 as a voluntary association of nuclear supplier countries, aiming to implement stricter measures to ensure nuclear nonproliferation through oversight of nuclear exports.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was introduced and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996. Over 180 countries are signatories, but it has not yet entered into force because it requires ratification by 44 specific countries, including nuclear-weapon states. The CTBT aims to prevent all types of nuclear tests (sea-based, land-based, and space-based), limit radioactive fallout, and promote international peace and security.

Nevertheless, this comprehensive endeavor by the UNGA failed to deter India from conducting nuclear detonations. India carried out a series of nuclear tests under “Operation Shakti,” known as Pokhran-II, on May 11 and 13, 1998, at the Indian Army’s Pokhran Test Range in Rajasthan. This drive began with a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 and culminated in the development of nuclear weapons in 1998, revealing India’s underlying ambitions regarding its nuclear program. India’s nuclear tests shocked the international community and led to widespread condemnation and economic sanctions from countries such as Japan and the United States. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1172 to condemn the Indian tests.

In response to India’s five nuclear tests, Pakistan conducted six nuclear tests at Chagi on May 28, 1998. With both Pakistan and India acquiring nuclear capability, the strategic balance of power between these two arch-rivals shifted. The nuclearization of Pakistan not only undermined India’s conventional superiority but also enhanced Pakistan’s deterrent capability against its formidable rival. India initiated this ominous contest of nuclearization in South Asia, and thus bears responsibility for the ensuing arms race.

In 1998, Pakistan offered a Strategic Restraint Regime aimed at fostering substantial peace in South Asia, emphasizing the need for a comparable reduction in armed forces, stable deterrence, and peaceful resolution of all disputes. However, India did not appear serious about engaging in peaceful dialogue or settling interstate disputes post-nuclearization; rather, it seems more interested in dragging both nations into a complex arms race.

Surprisingly, India received preferential treatment from the international community and nuclear watchdogs, especially from the United States, following the Strategic Partnership Pact in October 2008 under the Bush administration. The US-led Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) granted special and exclusive waivers to India, allowing it to engage in nuclear trade and access nuclear technology and materials, despite India not being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the CTBT, and its nuclear program not being under the international safeguards set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This preferential treatment has not only endangered the security dynamics of the region but also encouraged India to modernize and advance its nuclear arsenal, thus reducing the nuclear threshold in the region and increasing the risk of nuclear war, with potentially catastrophic consequences for South Asia and the entire world.

In Southern Asia today, various geopolitical and security developments—including the resurgence of great power competition, the rise of nationalism, and the role of emerging technologies—make it more likely that interstate crises will escalate into major conflicts. Given the increasing risk of a catastrophic confrontation, the critical questions arise: What can Pakistan and India do to avoid nuclear conflict and ease tensions in the region? Can both nations reach a treaty to foster stability? Can they put the brakes on the ongoing arms race amidst advancing technology? These are urgent questions that need answers before we face a nuclear calamity and the repercussions of a self-inflicted crisis.