Twelve Days of Crisis: Decoding the 2025 Israel-Iran Conflict

Twelve Days of Crisis: Decoding the 2025 Israel-Iran Conflict

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In June 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a large preemptive air strike on Iran’s nuclear, civilian, and military infrastructure, killing hundreds of Iranian civilians and military personnel, including senior commanders. Within days, Iran retaliated with missile and drone attacks. The United States soon joined the conflict; on June 21, U.S. B-2 stealth bombers targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities, citing the need to defend Israel. After about 12 days of fighting, a ceasefire was reached on June 24. This paper provides a detailed account of the conflict, analyzes the strategic motives of Israel, the U.S., and Iran, and explores the legal issues raised by preemptive strikes and self-defense claims. It assesses the effect on Iran’s nuclear program and regional stability, drawing comparisons to the 2003 Iraq War and the collapse of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. The paper concludes with implications for future diplomacy and security efforts in the Middle East. Throughout, evidence from current analyses and official sources is referenced.

Introduction:

In June 2025, a dramatic escalation occurred in the Middle East as Israel and Iran engaged in direct military conflict, drawing in the United States.  On 13 June 2025, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) jets and cruise missiles attacked dozens of targets inside Iran in Operation Rising Lion, an unprecedented preemptive air campaign against Iran’s nuclear sites and military command centers. Israel’s government justified the operation as necessary to forestall an “existential threat” from Iran’s near-term nuclear weapons capability. Iranian leaders, however, denounced the strikes as illegal aggression that violated international law and their sovereign rights. Iran responded by firing hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones at Israeli cities over the next few days, in what was billed as a “last warning” retaliation.  On 21 June 2025, the U.S. Air Force entered the conflict in Operation Midnight Hammer: in coordinated strikes with Israel, U.S. B‑2 bombers dropped large bunker-buster munitions on Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan nuclear facilities. A massive, TV-broadcast Tomahawk cruise missile strike from an American submarine also reportedly struck Iran’s buried nuclear sites and leadership command post that day. By late June, a fragile ceasefire took hold under U.S. mediation. The exact terms of the truce were not public, but combat operations ceased after a dozen days of fighting.  Both Israel and Iran claimed victory, and President Trump styled himself a hero, but analysts noted that Iran’s nuclear program remained largely intact and regional tensions were severely heightened.

This Paper provoked intense debate in academic and policy circles.  How did Israel and the U.S justify these preemptive strikes under international law?  Were the attacks lawful acts of self-defense, or illegal wars of aggression?  What strategic objectives drove each side?  Crucially, how did the conflict affect Iran’s nuclear capabilities and the prospects for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East?

US Israel Iran conflict
US-Israel-Iran conflict

The narrative of Operation Rising Lion draws unmistakable parallels to past controversies: proponents likened it to a justified preventive war, while critics pointed to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq (also justified by ambiguous WMD threats) and the scrapping of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal as warning signs.  This paper examines the conflict comprehensively: first by detailing the military events and outcomes, then by analyzing motivations and international-law issues, followed by an assessment of the nuclear and regional security impact.  Historical precedents will be discussed, and finally, the paper will consider the broader implications and recommendations for future diplomacy.

Narrative of the Conflict:

Operation Rising Lion

On 13 June 2025, just after dawn, the Israeli Air Force and Navy launched a massive surprise attack on Iranian territory, code-named Operation Rising Lion.  According to war correspondents, over 200 Israeli fighter jets and cruise missiles struck more than 100 targets across Iran, including multiple parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. (Dawn, June 13, 2025)   Satellite imagery and open-source reports show that Israel destroyed the above-ground buildings and electrical grid at Natanz’s pilot enrichment plant (PFEP), severely damaging that facility.  Israel also struck the uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities at Esfahan, which produce key nuclear fuel materials, and targeted Iran’s sprawling missile networks and underground bunkers.  Israeli munitions reportedly penetrated parts of Fordow at great cost; the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) is buried 80–90 m underground and is Iran’s most hardened site for 60% uranium enrichment.  U.S. intelligence later reported that the Fordow site was not penetrated – U.S. GBU-57 bunker busters were needed for such depth, and that Iran’s centrifuges and stockpiles remained mostly intact despite Israeli claims.

In parallel, Israel’s Mossad intelligence service and special forces took unprecedented direct action.  Publicly released IDF footage showed Mossad agents sabotaging Iranian air defenses and positioning drones inside Iran. Most ominously, Israel also conducted a series of targeted killings of senior Iranian figures.  Within hours, dozens of Iranian nuclear scientists and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders were assassinated in strikes on safe houses and research centers.  Time reported the death of Saeed Izadi, a key Quds Force commander, and Behnam Shahriyari, head of the Quds Force’s Weapons Transfer Unit. These decapitation strikes “killed the top echelon of Iran’s military command”. including at least two IRGC generals and five top nuclear scientists, according to Iran’s semi-official media.  Total Iranian casualties from the initial air campaign are estimated at roughly 935 killed and over 5,000 wounded, mostly military and security personnel but also including some civilians in areas hit. (Al Jazeera, June 23)

Israel explicitly characterized the 13 June strike as an act of self-defense against an imminent existential threat.  Prime Minister Netanyahu said Iran was “closer than ever” to a nuclear weapon and vowed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.  In televised comments, Netanyahu declared he was prepared to do “whatever is necessary to achieve our dual aim, to remove two existential threats, the nuclear threat and the ballistic missile threat,” from Iran. His national security advisers reportedly cited an incoming Iranian attack as their justification.  Israeli sources later told The New York Times that Iran had been plotting missile attacks on Israel that very week. Israeli statements emphasized urgency: their strike was apparently timed to preempt Iran’s nuclear breakout and to protect Israel from ongoing drone/missile attacks by Iran and its proxies.  Prime Minister Netanyahu even suggested Iranian regime change might be an outcome, calling Tehran’s clerical government “very weak”.

Operation True Promise III (13–21 June)

Within hours of the Israeli onslaught, Iran declared the operation a “War of Aggression” by Israel.  Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei condemned the strikes, vowing to “open the gates of hell” on Israel in retribution. On 13–14 June, Iran’s General Staff organized a massive launch of ballistic missiles and Iranian-made suicide drones at Israel.  Reporting indicates Iran fired 300–550 ballistic missiles in multiple waves against Israeli military and civilian targets, along with over 1,000 loitering attack drones.  Most of Iran’s drones were shot down by Israeli air defenses; Iranian missiles were intercepted at a very high rate by Israel’s Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome systems, with U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries assisting. Nevertheless, dozens of Iranian warheads penetrated the defenses, striking cities.  By the end of these barrages, at least 29 Israelis were killed and over 3,400 wounded in various attacks, with many buildings destroyed. Israeli government communications played down the damage publicly, but internally,y the attacks caused a rare moment of vulnerability, with large portions of Tel Aviv and Haifa subject to missile warning sirens and civilian lockdowns. (Al Jazeera, June 13)

Iran’s military response, code-named Operation True Promise III, was nonetheless modest given the scale of Israel’s initial strike.  Iranian forces reported damaging some Israeli air defense batteries, but large-scale counterattacks were limited.  One analysis notes Iran had wanted to unleash its proxies, but Israeli preemptive strikes had already degraded many militant HQs and capabilities, and the proxies were further constrained by domestic political factors. In practice, aside from the missile and drone barrages, Iran confined itself to a bombing run on U.S. military assets in Qatar on 23 June; thankfully ,that had no casualties.  Still, the psychological effect of Iran’s response was huge, stoking fears of a full-scale regional war and even World War III among foreign observers. (CBS News, June 24)

U.S. Entry and Operation Midnight Hammer (19–21 June)

Initially, the United States did not participate in the combat.  President Trump praised Israel’s right to defend itself, but publicly expressed ambivalence about joining the fight.  According to Reuters, Trump waved off confrontation on U.S. television on 15 June: “We are not involved in strikes against Iran; our priority is protecting our forces”. Nonetheless, U.S. officials were alarmed at the possibility of Iran retaliating directly against American interests or allies.  On 19 June, Trump issued an ultimatum: Iran had two weeks to capitulate or face U.S. action.  Two days later, U.S. B-2 stealth bombers flew from Missouri to covertly strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan, using large bunker-busting bombs. (Reuters, June 22) The U.S. military claimed great success: President Trump boasted on TV that Iran’s nuclear program had been “completely and obliterated”, and Defense Secretary Hegseth said no Iranian fighters ever flew to intercept the bombers. Internally, intelligence analysts gave more cautious estimates: the U.S. Pentagon later admitted that while Iran’s above-ground structures were damaged, the core program components were largely intact because some stockpiles had been moved underground. Leaked intelligence reports suggested Iran’s capability was only set back months, not permanently destroyed. (BBC News, June 25) Iran’s government asserted that the U.S. strikes were further proof of a U.S.–Israeli war of aggression, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and UNSC Resolution 2231. Iran’s supreme leader formally called the Americans “an accomplice in aggression”.

Ceasefire (24 June)

Despite fears of a prolonged war, a ceasefire was surprisingly held on 24 June.  U.S. diplomacy, backed by some moderating voices among Iran’s allies, led both sides to stand down.  According to War on the Rocks, President Trump suddenly announced on 24 June that the war would end, and Iranian leaders agreed to a halt in exchange for certain undisclosed concessions. The Iranian Foreign Ministry then affirmed that Iranian forces would stop firing on Israel, while the IDF likewise ceased offensive operations.  The deal apparently involved a tacit understanding that Iran would neither pursue new nuclear breakthroughs nor launch further retaliatory strikes, and that Israel would avoid killing any more Iranian leaders.  Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian, in a post-ceasefire interview, called for renewed diplomacy: he claimed Iran could resolve differences with the U.S. “through dialogue” but warned that trust had been destroyed by the attacks. He also publicly accused Israel of attempting to assassinate him during the war.  The ceasefire’s durability has been fragile, but active hostilities did not resume immediately.  Both Jerusalem and Tehran proclaimed a form of victory: Israel touted its damage to Iran’s program, while Iran celebrated having repelled the invaders and winning the support of other countries. (New York Times, June 26)

International Law: Preemption and Self-Defense:

The legality of preemptive military action is one of the thorniest issues in international law.  Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs”. On its face, Article 51 requires an actual armed attack as the trigger for defensive force.  Classic international jurisprudence (e.g., the ICJ’s Nicaragua case) reads Article 51 narrowly: States can lawfully defend only after being attacked, absent a Security Council mandate. However, the customary law of self-defense also recognizes an anticipatory or “Caroline” doctrine: in extraordinary circumstances of necessity and imminence, a State may strike to intercept an attack in its “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation”. The problem is applying that doctrine to modern threats, especially nuclear ones.  There is no precise legal formula for imminence today; the security environment now includes covert plots and WMD risk, not just visible troop movements.

Israel and the United States invoked this traditional self-defense principle.  Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant publicly called the strike “preemptive”, and the Israeli UN letter of 14 June explicitly claimed it was acting in self-defense to foil “imminent” Iranian attacks.  Israeli and U.S. officials pointed to Iran’s decades-long hostility (missile launches in 2024 and proxy attacks) as context. Legally, supporters of Israel cite evolving interpretations: foremost scholars and some governments accept a broader “imminence” test for massive threats, allowing force when an attack is certain and a “last window of opportunity” remains. Michael Schmitt, a leading jurist, notes that even if Iran had not yet launched missiles on 13 June, the close coordination of nuclear and missile programs and the “ripe, irreversibly committed” nature of the Iranian threat could satisfy necessity. Schmitt ultimately judged Israel’s case “colorable,” meaning arguable under these modern anticipatory self-defense criteria.

International responses reflected these legal ambiguities.  On 6 July, Iran’s foreign minister told a summit of the BRICS nations that “the US-Israeli attacks on our nuclear facilities were in stark violation of the NPT and UN Security Council Resolution 2231”. The BRICS statement, issued without naming names, condemned the June strikes as “military strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran” that “constitute a violation of international law”. The United Nations Secretary-General noted that any use of force must conform to the UN Charter, implicitly recalling that past U.S.-Israeli justifications had been controversial.  The legal debate over this incident essentially reopened questions that haunted the Iraq War era: If a state truly believes it faces an existential threat, can it lawfully strike first?  The American and Israeli positions in 2025 reflect a broadening acceptance of anticipatory self-defense against nuclear threats, while their critics see it as an erosion of the post‑World War II prohibition on aggressive war. (Iran Daily, July 08)

Impact on Iran’s Nuclear Program and Regional Security:

Militarily, the strikes inflicted real but limited damage on Iran’s nuclear enterprise.  The combined Israeli and American bombing of Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan disabled some infrastructure and delayed efforts, but apparently did not eradicate the program.  Satellite analysis and agency reports after the war showed: Natanz’s above-ground pilot plant and electricity had been destroyed, reducing 60%-enrichment output; Esfahan’s uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants were also damaged. However, Iran’s main Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), containing 82 cascades of centrifuges, was underground and remained unscathed. If Iranian intelligence had moved centrifuge components or HEU to secret bunkers, those might have escaped destruction.  Early leaks indicated that Iran did accelerate its breakout timeline: a U.S. intelligence report allegedly said Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in a matter of days to weeks, though the IAEA had an inspector on site and claimed no evidence of a weapons intent. (IAEA, June 26)

Experts conclude the strikes produced at most a short-term delay.  The Arms Control Association (ACA) summarized this view: “the premature use of force set back Iran’s nuclear program temporarily, but risks pushing Tehran closer to nuclear weapons in the long term”. ACA noted that despite Trump’s boast of “obliteration,” Iran retained critical materials and infrastructure to rebuild quickly.  Its analysts warned that Iran, having been attacked during talks, now has stronger motivation to obtain a deterrent weapon and to distrust any future Western deal. Indeed, Iran’s leaders publicly vowed to redouble enrichment and even passed laws barring UN inspectors from many sites, claiming the IAEA was complicit in the attack. Iran’s President Pezeshkian told Tucker Carlson in early July that Iran was still willing to negotiate nuclear limits with the U.S., but only after being assured Israel wouldn’t strike again mid-conversation. (Reuters, June 25)

Even before June 2025, Iran had been moving toward the breakout threshold: after the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran had incrementally increased enrichment.  By mid-2025, it was estimated to have enough 60%-enriched uranium for at least 5 bombs and was days away from weaponizing if it decided to do so. (Al-Jazeera, June 29) ACA notes Iran’s near-zero breakout timeline was only possible because the IAEA was still monitoring the facilities; a successful strike or closure of that inspection regime could have made clandestine weaponization much easier.  In fact, Iran’s actions after the war suggest it is digging in and moving toward an enhanced latent capability.

Impact on Iran’s Nuclear Program and Regional Security

Regionally, the conflict undermined stability.  For now, the direct war ended, but tensions soared.  Allies of Iran felt threatened; Israel’s warnings to attack any Houthi missile attempts or strike Syrian targets raised the specter of a truly regional conflagration.  Israel’s neighbors, especially Gulf states, reacted with alarm.  Oil prices spiked on fears of supply disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz; Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Lebanon briefly prepared reprisals.  U.S. air forces remained on alert across the Middle East.  The “red lines” of previous decades had been crossed, prompting debate about arms control norms.

The ceasefire’s political outcome was inconclusive.  On the one hand, Israel achieved a propaganda victory, showcasing its unmatched strike capability and deterring Iran. On the other hand, the apparent survival of Iran’s program meant the very threat Israel feared remained alive.  Iranian leaders, for their part, emerged largely intact.  Khamenei’s regime was shaken (two senior commanders dead), but it stoked nationalist fervor and secured the backing of allies.  The BRICS statement and some Arab diplomats’ statements condemned the Israeli action. widening Iran’s international support.  Notably, Iran quickly revived its nuclear negotiating stance, likely demanding iron-clad security guarantees and inspection enforcement as the price for any deal.

Importantly, nuclear experts warn that the war left uncertainty.  Bombing did not find or destroy all the fissile material: enriched uranium stocks in Isfahan or in centrifuges underground may survive.  A leaked U.S. intelligence estimate said Iran had removed its HEU from sites before the strikes, meaning neither Israel nor the U.S. achieved a definitive blow.  Uncertainty about missing material will complicate any future verification regime. (CNN, June 25)

Arms Control analysts argue that only diplomacy can secure a long-term solution now.  They recommend immediate resumption of negotiations on a tough but balanced deal.  One proposal is a “fuel swap” scheme: Iran could continue enriching uranium up to a certain point under strict IAEA monitoring, while sending higher-grade material to be processed abroad (for example, in Saudi Arabia, as ACA’s task force has suggested).  Another is a new U.S.-Iran security pact to assuage Tehran’s fear of attack if it verifiably limits its program.  Crucially, experts agree that isolating or bombarding Iran unilaterally only fuels its incentives to get nuclear weapons.  ACA stresses that “failure to prioritize pragmatic diplomacy now” could leave the region with a nuclear-armed Iran and even greater risk of war.

Historical Parallels:

Observers immediately noted unsettling echoes of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.  Both conflicts were justified as preemptive against alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats, with opponents calling them unlawful wars of aggression.  The UN Secretary-General had famously warned against “pre-emptive self-defense” in 2003, stating bluntly that the Iraq war violated the UN Charter. Kofi Annan’s comments (Sept 2004) – that the Iraq invasion was “illegal” and not UN-sanctioned – were remembered and cited by critics of the 2025 strikes.  Just as Britain and the U.S. in 2003 used distorted intelligence on Iraq’s alleged WMD, some analysts accuse Israel and the U.S. in 2025 of inflating Iran’s threat to justify force.  Media outlets contrasted Israel’s claims of Iranian imminence with past false alarms.  American and European legal experts pointed out that the U.S. itself had refused to invoke preventive defense in 2003, instead stretching a ceasefire resolution (UNSCR 678) to justify Iraqi regime change.

Similarly, the conflict revisited the legacy of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and its unraveling.  The Trump administration’s 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is widely seen as a strategic misstep that undermined nonproliferation.  By mid-2025, Iran had fully walked away from key deal limits.  The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists notes that, under the “maximum pressure” campaign, Iran responded by expanding enrichment and by threatening to rearm if attacked. Ironically, just weeks before the war Iran was reportedly close to a new U.S. proposal to revive a nuclear accord; the Israeli strikes shattered those plans. Analysts compare this to how Saddam Hussein was promised leniency if he complied with U.N. demands in 2003, only to be invaded days later.  In 2025, Iranian officials demanded assurance that any future U.S.–Iran agreement must guarantee that Israel would not strike Iran again.  The withdrawal from JCPOA had already eroded Iranian trust; now, in Pezeshkian’s words, “How can we know for sure that the Israeli regime will not be given permission again to attack us?”.

Implications and Recommendations:

The June 2025 conflict poses profound questions for the future.  On the diplomatic front, the ceasefire offers only a temporary respite.  Both Israel and Iran are left dissatisfied: Israel has not eliminated the nuclear threat, and Iran’s leadership feels vulnerable.  Re-initiating diplomacy will be extremely challenging under the new conditions.  Iran’s leaders publicly accuse the U.S. of complicity in an attack that violated agreed international resolutions, making trust in American guarantees near zero.  U.S. credibility was indeed damaged: by unilaterally striking during talks, Washington signaled it might abandon any deal if it saw fit.  The Arms Control Association warns that “negotiators will now need to contend with uncertainties about Iran’s remaining infrastructure and the whereabouts of its stockpile.

Nevertheless, diplomacy is more important than ever.  The alternative is nuclear proliferation.  The U.S. and its partners should urgently reopen channels with Iran to negotiate constraints.  The war has underscored that neither side can destroy the other’s nuclear potential by force alone.  A sustainable solution likely requires a new kind of deal: perhaps a step-by-step framework that includes mutual freezes or rollbacks.

The conflict highlights the urgent need to clarify international rules on preemption.  Policymakers should work to reinforce norms against aggressive war, perhaps through new UN General Assembly declarations or Security Council reforms, so that any future escalation of this kind is subject to clearer legal checks.  The International Court of Justice or a UN inquiry might be tasked with assessing the lawfulness of these specific strikes. At minimum, great powers should agree that secretive “anticipatory” war carries heavy risks and should be resorted to only when ample evidence of imminent attack exists.

Israel should consider bolstering its defense to reduce the pressure to strike first.  This includes improving underground shelters for civilians, further integrating U.S. missile defense systems, and strengthening cyber defenses. Iran similarly faces choices: by scaling back its nuclear work, Tehran could normalize relations and avoid further confrontation.  Alternatively, if Iran pursues actual weaponization, as some analysts fear, the region could enter a dangerous arms race.  Only sustained deterrence combined with credible promises of severe consequences for any non-signatory state seeking nuclear arms can dissuade proliferation.

The conflict’s legacy will affect global politics.  The June 2025 war has made Mideast security a potential flashpoint in U.S. domestic politics. It will test international institutions: can the UN or IAEA still function as mediators?  The BRICS involvement and global reactions show that the U.S. and Israel no longer speak for the entire world.  Diplomats should build on any consensus found: for instance, the BRICS called for respecting civilian infrastructure, which could become the basis of a new effort to strengthen protections for nuclear and civilian sites under international law.

Conclusion:

Operation Rising Lion and the subsequent round of strikes escalated long-standing tensions to the brink of all-out war.  Militarily, Israel and the U.S. demonstrated overwhelming force and degraded some Iranian capabilities.  But the core conflict between nuclear ambitions and existential fears remains unresolved.  The war did not “destroy” Iran’s program; it likely entrenched Iran’s determination to secure a nuclear deterrent if at all possible. Going forward, an arms race and proliferation risks have increased.  Diplomatically, the trust gap is wide: Iran will be skeptical of any U.S.-brokered deal, and Israel will demand iron-clad limitations on Iran.  The international community must now push all sides back to the negotiating table with realistic, enforceable terms. History shows that military preemption often backfires.  As Araghchi warned, failing to hold Israel accountable could leave the region at the mercy of unchecked powers. Conversely, appeasing Iran’s grievances without constraints could encourage further bad behavior.  The most prudent path is a balanced one: vigorous diplomacy supported by credible deterrence.  The United States might lead an effort to convene a new international framework, perhaps in cooperation with non-Western powers, to ensure that neither Iran nor any other state attains unchecked nuclear forces.  Israel should use its improved intelligence capabilities to deter aggression short of war.  Iran should be offered a secure, normalized relationship in exchange for strict nuclear limits verified by international inspectors.

The 2025 Iran–Israel War, though brief, illuminated the fault lines of 21st-century security.  Its lessons echo the failed wars of the past (Iraq 2003) and the collapse of earlier arms control accords Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The outcome cannot be judiciously resolved by bombs alone.  Lasting peace and stability will require renewed adherence to international law, creative diplomacy, and mutual security guarantees.  The zero-sum game logic of preemption must give way to a collective recognition: an unstable Middle East with bombs buried underground, like Fordow, serves no one’s long-term interests.  By integrating the world’s attention on restraint and negotiation, the very lessons learned too late from history, policymakers may steer away from another cycle of violence.

Lasting security cannot be achieved through airstrikes alone. Military action may delay nuclear development, but it cannot eliminate capability or address the underlying mistrust. A sustainable path forward requires urgent diplomacy. This includes re-engaging Iran through renewed P5+1 negotiations, backed by a United Nations Security Council resolution that reinforces nonproliferation commitments and establishes stricter thresholds for the use of force. A regional fuel-swap mechanism monitored by the IAEA and hosted in a neutral state could offer Iran a peaceful pathway to nuclear energy while reducing the risk of weaponization. Such measures must be verifiable, enforceable, and embedded in a broader security framework that includes credible guarantees against future aggression.

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